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A bstract:
A difficult reality for international affairs specialists to face is that, despite solid effort and
reams o f research over the years, few real gains have been in made in understanding or
predicting world events. Narrative research in international affairs has been criticized for
failing to solidly prove causality. Positivist research is progressing to better quantify
political data and show causality, but it deals poorly with subjective information. The
problem with international events is that they contain an enormous number o f complex
variables, many o f which we have little idea how to measure. To address these problems,
researchers narrow the focus o f their study to control the immense number and complexity
o f their variables. The quantification o f complex social events, however, inevitably leads
to a skewed vision o f the world from which little can be learned. Furthermore, if usable
data begins to dictate the research, an accurate picture o f the world is lost.- As a result o f
these difficulties, researchers have sometimes ended up placing misguided attention on
certain kinds o f variables and have consequently failed to understand some world events
when they do not relate to these particular variables. Additionally, political science has
become so widely diversified that researchers find it hard to understand one another and to
see events from the broadest perspective. Suggested here is a six category system to help
recognize and order data from a political event. This system recognizes actors, actor
preferences, actor assets and liabilities, actor behavior, actor relationships, and game
outcomes. This system helps expand the database to include previously marginalized
actors, and can suggest a common epistemological starting point for research, theorymaking, and dialog among political scientists. Employing this ordering o f event
information should help researchers get a better overall picture o f a political event from
which they can better select variables for research and better construct experiments and
theories. Well-known examples drawn from various international relations issues will be
used to help illustrate how this categorization process works.

Part I - Introduction

International relations theory has led a difficult existence as a social science.
Arguably the most noble o f disciplines whose major intent, among others, has been the
prevention o f wars has never come close to such an ideal, nor has it been able to
coherently explain such conflicts when they happen. Just when a generation o f political
scientists was beginning to grasp and sometimes even manage a bi-polar world, the Cold
W ar ended, collapsing this structure and rendering it nearly as irrelevant as ‘Checkpoint
Charlie’ now is in Berlin. The challenge facing international relations experts involves not
only the observation and reporting o f international events, but the understanding and
management o f them as well. The cause of these, so far, insurmountable difficulties is the
highly complex nature o f human political interaction. Our means of studying political
phenomena needs improvement in order to begin to answer the questions that we have set
out to ask.

Research in international relations has been conducted in a number o f ways over
time from Thucydides’ descriptive account o f the Peloponnesian War, to the prescriptive
writing o f Immanuel Kant, to the analytical writing o f Hans M orgenthau.1/2 As insightful
and elucidating as these approaches are, they do little for those practicing public policy

!In Immanuel Kant's Fundamental Principles o f the Metaphvsic o f Morals, his discussion o f rational knowledge, reason,
morals, and the Categorical Imperative create a means by which moral human behavior may be prescribed.
2Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations describes a considerable number o f historical events from which he draws
general conclusions and generates his theory o f power. This goes beyond Thucydides' story-like retelling o f political events
involving little universalizable analysis.
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who need real guidance on what to do in real-life situations. Furthermore, lacking in all of
these efforts is a truly causal theory which can be used to explain or predict how
international events happen. Working to address this void, the positivist trend which
swept through all social sciences has touched international relations as well. The
understandable desire to generate empirically provable theory attracts researchers to the
scientifically-oriented quantitative approach. Authors such as J. David Singer and Bruce
Bueno De Mesquita helped introduce international relations to the quantification o f human
and state interaction.3 / 4 This positivist approach now commands the field despite a still
limited ability to clearly instruct policy-makers on. what to do, or adequately predict
political events.5

International relations theory is faced, therefore, with two overall approaches;
narrative, and positivist. The two are different in outlook and process, and, not
surprisingly, the two beget different products. The narrative approach has the ability to
describe and document a lot, but it usually proves little. The positivist approach is
scientifically verifiable, but it requires a more narrow range of focus.6 Understandably,
political scientists are reluctant to relinquish their capability to thoroughly chronicle
political life in the way they see most fitting for an event, but they recognize the need, like

3J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates o f War: I Research Origins and Rationale (New York: The Free Press, 1979)
4Bruce Bueno D e Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)
5Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits o f a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs " in Explaining
International Relations Since 1945 , ed. Ngaire Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 69.
6David A. Bositis, Research Designs for Political Science: Contrivance and Demonstration in Theory and Practice
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 12.
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all scientists, to be able to prove something from their work. These methodological
limitations create their own problems. The ideal situation would be to assist both o f these
two approaches in a way that their respective benefits may be exploited and their pitfalls
avoided. Suggested here is a means o f arranging all event data using the rational actor
theoretical structure which will enable categorization o f political events and information.
With a new means o f organizing data from a political event, researchers can more easily
observe and select variables for further qualitative or quantitative, narrative or positive,
normative or empirical study. At the same time, they will also be forced to make more
informed and considered choices when selecting their research variables.

In the quest for simplicity in research and theory-building, much is lost. John
Lewis Gaddis notes that political scientists, "know that if they do not impose such
exclusions and controls, complications will quickly overwhelm their calculations, and
predictability will suffer."7 This problem is very serious and carries major implications for
the study o f international relations theory. Historically under-represented actors such as
women and the poor are ignored by researchers concentrating on issues they feel are more
important like the Super Power conflict. Cynthia Enloe sees a serious problem in this
research strategy which presumes those at the "margins, silences and bottom rungs" o f
political life cannot possibly have significance in world affairs.8 Enloe observes that

7(John Lewis Gaddis 1992/1993, 55)
8Cynthia Enloe, "Margins, silences and bottom rungs: how to overcome the underestimation o f power in the study o f
international relations," In International Theory: Positivism & Bevond. Edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia
Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 188.
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political scientist’s ignore the tremendous amount o f power which is exerted to keep those
at the margins from moving to the center o f the political arena. Failing to recognize this
means ignoring a major part o f the story.9 Ted H opf supports Enloe's point when he looks
at international relations researchers response to the end o f the cold war. What political
research that was being done in this area was fine. The problem, however, lay in what was
not being done. There were various elements of political life researchers undervalued in
the overall U.S./Soviet picture. These overlooked areas, such as low-level domestic
sources o f economic and political discontent, ended up being the leading cause o f the
break-up o f the Soviet Union. Had we been forced to look at the bigger picture o f what
was happening in the Soviet Union in the 1980's, we might not have been so surprised
when communism suddenly fell.10 Researchers in their singular concentration on whatever
issues were popularly deemed most relevant, never considered the numerous internal
pressures present within the Soviet Union as worthy topics of engagement during the Cold
War. All o f this underscores the fact that international relations researchers need a better
way o f systematically looking at the whole story to recognize what is really happening.
Marysia Zalewski states, "We need to re-think the discipline in ways that will disturb the
existing boundaries o f both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what
we assume to be legitimate ways o f constructing knowledge about the world."11

9(Cynthia Enloe 1996, 188)
10Ted Hopf, "Getting the End o f the Cold War Wrong," International Security. VOL 18, NO. 2 (Fall 1993): 202.
“Marysia Zalewski, "'All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up': theories, theorists, theorizing," in International
Theory: Positivism and Bevond. ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, & Marysia Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 352.
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Part II - Literature Review

Some see international relations theory to be nearly in the midst o f a new
renascence.12 Since World War II, international relations theory experienced few
significant philosophical or practical challenges until the trend toward quantification o f
social events became the newest approach in social science research during the 1950's.
This challenge, and the conflicts and confusion around this new approach has become
known as the, so called, 'Second Debate.' Thirty years later, with little progress toward
the resolution o f that debate, a newer, though similar, dilemma has arisen. The 'Third
Debate' opens up international relations theory to accommodate a greater variety of
epistemological approaches. The historical research versus scientific method debate has
never been adequately resolved as quantitative research methods permeate the social
sciences; recent efforts by political scientists who have brought in critical theory,
linguistic criticism, feminism, and third world perspectives have opened up political
science to the most considered and widest range o f theoretical dialog to date. O f course,
the result is an impassioned and all-encompassing dialog which, in itself, is under debate as
either strengthening and enriching the discipline or wasting everyone's time.13

As a starting point, political scientists appear to agree that the goal o f their work is

12Y osef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positive Era," International Studies
Quarterly VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 250.
13K. J. Holsti, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories o f All?," International Studies Quarterly
VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 261.
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to understand international political events better. Doing so, it is believed, will lead us as
citizens, corporations, and world leaders to be more effective in pursuing things like
justice, economic growth, national security, and whatever else we might need.
Remarkably, however, the above goal o f international relations already generates
controversy among political scientists. After World War II the, so-called, 'First Debate' in
international relations theory arose over whether theorists should embrace traditional
, realism or the new liberalism. On the one hand, realism's concise world view easily
focused attention on states and their power attributes. Liberalism, on the other hand, was
better suited to addressing issues such as newly emerging cooperative world political and
economic systems. One o f the challenges of liberalism was that many o f its ways of
looking at the world could simply be seen as current problems with realism, and not any
real new theory.14 Additionally, world leaders still behaved much as if other grass-roots or
trans-national institutions did not exist and had no impact on their dealings.15

N ot long after Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, which many herald as the
starting point for modern international relations, and certainly the introduction o f realism
in international relations, researchers quickly began questioning exactly who or what was
seeking to increase power. This has become known as the 'level of analysis' question. In
Man. the State and War, neo-realist, Kenneth Waltz elaborated on this question in his

14Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Neorealism and its
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 344.
1501e Weaver, "The rise and fall o f the inter-paradigm debate," in International theory: positivism and beyond, ed. Steve
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 150.
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description o f his various 'images.' The focus o f the first image is on human behavior
which is best exemplified by examination of the individual. The later images build on the
theoretical foundation o f the first in ways which then incorporate local and national
governments and international structures.16 This work helped opened up international
relations to a more serious consideration of the level o f analysis issue.

Current international relations theory includes considerable research and discussion
on the level o f analysis issue. Everyone understands that there are international, national,
regional, and local governing bodies which make laws and policy whose impact is felt far
off, as well as various individuals, corporations, and organizations who engage in activities
which play a role in international relations outcomes. Still, we understand poorly how this
works. Additionally, basic questions such as what constitutes a level, how many are there,
and which ones play which roles in international relations are still in need o f answers.17
Structuralism in international relations seeks to specifically address these questions. Barry
Gills maintains that theories and research focusing on the global level negate "the myriad
o f transformative processes, be they at the local, national, or global level which are at the
heart o f [structuralist] analysis.''18 The means by which different level actors interact
among one another, and which levels influence international affairs under what specific

l<sKenneth N. Waltz, Man the state and war (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 119.
17Barry Buzan, "The Level o f Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered," in International Relations
Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 201-202.
l8Ronan P. Palen and Barry Gills, Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in IR (Boulder:
Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994), 7.
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kinds o f world events are important questions for which answers must be sought.19
Rational actor theory in social science takes the 'actor' as a central concept. International
\

relations theorists have had a generalized concept o f actors as being governments.
Researchers are learning, however, that the picture is far more complex than that. As will
be discussed further on, actors are the essential critical element in political science;
figuring out who they are, and the interactions they have among themselves is a complex,
yet critical, undertaking.

In the past, international relations research was conducted using the narrative
approach. Events and concepts were recorded in a linear story-like fashion reflecting
political events as the writer viewed them. Depending upon the researchers perspective o f
an event, their understanding of the various aspects o f the event, and their political or
ideological bias, the narrative was always a picture o f reality as seen through the eyes of
the reporter or storyteller. Critics o f narrative-based research charge that turning history
into a story with a set beginning, middle, and end goes against the nature o f history.20
Additionally, they charge that it is impossible for the narrative approach to really reflect
%

any truth since it involves the subjective selection o f data to tell the story.21 This
distinction determines whether international relations theory is intended to be a normative
or empirical undertaking. When value judgements are made, even including the selection

1’(Barry Buzan 1995, 213)
“ Andrew Norman, "Telling it Like it Was: Historical Narratives on their Own Terms," History and Theory VOL. 30,
NO. 2 (1991): 126.
21(Andrew P. Norman 1991, 122)

o f data, theory becomes a normative practice.22 When pure fact is reported, theory is
thought to be empirical. This, however, will be discussed further below. Nazli Choucri
discusses this distinction further when she writes about international relations forecasting.
"The value-neutral posture o f science is sometimes confused with the value-driven
imperatives o f prophecy, resulting in an undifferentiated and often methodologically
unsound use o f both theory and method."23

As the social sciences developed during the post-war period, the trend toward the
quantitative measure o f social phenomena expanded. The scientific methods and
procedures used in the physical sciences were found to have validity in political science.
This movement toward the use of scientific methods in international relations has become
known as the 'Second Debate' as researchers struggle over the role o f historical and
narrative based research methods versus scientific methods. Measurements enabling
political scientists to understand the exact size and importance o f political events and
institutions have become the focus o f attention. While studying scientific methods,
political scientists have recognized another important benefit offered by this approach.
The scientific method requires a logical consistency in the construction o f theory and
argument to accompany any quantitative research.24 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita writes,
"No method, o f course, can substitute for good theory and good empirical research; but

^Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 142.
23Nazli Choucri, Forecasting in International Relations (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1978), 7.
24Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry. Logic, and International Relations (Columbia: University o f South Carolina
Press, 1989), 71.
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scientific methods can make more transparent whether problems have been dealt with
adequately or not.1,25 Often lacking in research prior to this period was a means of
establishing logical causal relationships between events in international relations as a
means o f predicting or explaining what happens in the world. Such features offer clear
benefits over earlier non-empirical approaches which offer only possible conjectures for
the future or plausible explanations for the past.

Game theory is another tool introduced to the discipline of international relations
which is an outgrowth o f the scientific method. Game theory is closely associated with
utility theory and probability theory found in mathematics. Here, the likelihood o f political
event outcomes can be measured by assigning probability values to different actor choices
throughout a game.26 Models of political events can be constructed to reflect situations
where there are two players or more, where various levels o f cooperation between players
may or may not exist, where information may or may not be known or shared, and where
player preferences and strategies known or not known.27 It is understood that game
theory can only be applied in situations where actors behave in a purely rational manner,
meaning that actors have some freedom to select among some choices to pursue the goals
they wish to achieve.28 Political science and international relations have benefitted

25Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits o f a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs," in Explaining
International Relations Since 1945. ed. Ngaire Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 72.
26James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Social Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 16.
27(James D. Morrow 1994, chapters 3-9)
28(James D. Morrow 1994, 7-8)
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tremendously from game theoretical calculations on the behavior o f different actors.
Game theory models have been used to explain everything from the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor to trench warfare in World War I.29

Despite some o f these real benefits which the scientific method has brought to
international relations theory and research, it has brought problems as well. A number o f
problems arise when applying scientific methods to social science problems. First, the
problem with this kind of research is that it only lends itself to the observation and
consideration o f certain kinds o f facts and phenomena.30 That which can be counted is
used in political research; that which cannot is not. The purpose of a model is to simplify
the bigger picture o f reality, but models are both good and bad. While they are very
effective tools for bringing order and simplicity to a complex world, in doing so, they
usually lose the full texture and meaning of reality when other variables are left out.
James M orrow advises that the most important factor to consider when constructing a
game theory model is to, "simplify, simplify, simplify."31 Doing so, however, precludes the
thoroughness and comprehensiveness which comes with complexity. Extensive research
during the Cold War focused on the military capabilities o f various Eastern and Western
bloc countries, but ignored many o f the domestic issues facing states. It was these
important but unexamined domestic issues which ultimately played the crucial role in the

29Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,-Inc., 1984), 181, 75.
^Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study o f Politics," World Politics VOL. 29, NO. 4
(July 1977): 507.
31(James D. Morrow 1994, 312)
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break up o f the Soviet Union. Limiting the consideration and focus o f study maintains the
logical validity o f the research argument, but does not necessarily guide us to an accurate
understanding o f international affairs. As John Lewis Gaddis writes, positivists “let
method determine subject, with the consequences one might expect in any situation in
which means are allowed to overshadow avowed ends.”32

A second problem encountered when employing scientific methods to answer
political questions further involves the status of countable objects. As mentioned above,
that which can be counted can be utilized in political research, and that which cannot is left
unexamined. Political researchers have had a difficult time measuring subjective concepts
like power, peace, justice, and morality. Measuring the effects o f power or peace in world
affairs is often done, but power and peace are quite different things from the effects of
power and peace. These concepts are some o f the most critical forces in international
relations, and just as they are difficult to define, they are even more difficult to count.

Third, there are a number o f ethical considerations as well. Since political events
involve real people, issues o f privacy, informed consent, "subject stress," and deception
are all real possibilities.33 As well, it is not easy to generate unbiased research criticizing
political elites or their policies after a researcher has worked hard to gain the access to and
trust o f such individuals to procure raw data. Researchers know that political elites, who

32(John Lewis Gaddis 1992/1993, 26)
33David A. Bositis, Research Designs for Political Science: Contrivance and Demonstration in Theory and Practice
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 130.
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are often at the center o f much international relations research, will be reluctant to
cooperate in the future if they will only be damaged by the experience.34 The result is a
strong incentive to construct data sets and infer conclusions which may or may not
accurately reflect how the world really is.

Finally, as research into political behavior progresses on a given political event,
unlike most objects o f observation in the physical sciences, states, world leaders, and
interest groups often involve themselves in the research as it is going on and often change
their political behavior based on preliminary research findings gathered during the research
program. The result is that the behavior o f the actor being studied changes as a result of
the research being done on it.35 Figuring out what variables effect which behavior and
why becomes increasingly difficult because a new variable (that being a political actor’s
response to research being done on it) is introduced into the system mid-study. The well
known problem o f the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle observed in the hard sciences can
occur wherever scientific methods are being used, including political science. If control of
the data is lost, the research effort will be lost. This behavior makes understanding what is
really going on that much more difficult.

There is no resolution to the controversy arising from the application o f scientific
method to international relations. The inadequacies of the scientific method combined

“ (David A. Bositis 1990, 131)
35(David A. Bositis 1990, 10)
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with other new influences, have created an opening for the 'Third Debate1in international
relations theory. Just as scientific methods swept through political science thirty years
before, the post-modern epistemological thinking developed in other fields has spread into
political science as well. Post-modernism's deployment in international relations theory
has provided even more legitimacy to theorists defection from pure scientific method.
Post-modernism "reformulates basic questions of modernist understanding in emphasizing
not the sovereign subject, or object, but instead the historical, cultural, and linguistic
practices in which subjects and objects (and theory and practice, facts and values) are
constructed."36 Effectively, what this means is that the yoke o f scientific method which
theorists have either eagerly or begrudgingly taken up loses it significance when faced with
such constitutive challenges. While the post-modern debate is still far from over, it has
helped open up international relations to many new perspectives.

The 'Third Debate' is based on a post-positivist construction o f international
relations theory. Post-positivism goes beyond the pure scientific method to shape this
method to work more meaningfully in a social science setting. New epistemological
frameworks and methodologies allow researchers greater latitude in research efforts.
Y osef Lapid writes, "emerging from this self-imposed positivist trap,... the post-positivist
counterpart - or counterparts - are far more accommodating in their acknowledged
posture o f tolerance and humility."37 While post-positivism offers excitement in its more

“ Jim George, Discourses in Global Politics: A Critical fRellntroduction to International Relations (Boulder: Lynne
Reiner Publishers, 1994), 192.
37(Y osef Lapid 1989, 246)
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inclusive approach to different perspectives, most agree that the scientific method should
never be discarded, and, further, there is danger in going too far off course on
questionable post-positive theoretical tangents.38/39

Currently, international relations theorists are finding much wider latitude in which
to work than they have in the past. The theoretical challenges, however, are much greater
as well.40 Fundamental challenges such as what constitutes fact in international relations
(as questioned by Post-modern theorists), which sets o f facts should be selected for use
(as questioned by Third World and Feminist theorists), and what should be done with
them (as questioned by everyone) make research a sobering task.41 International relations
is now at a point where there are models, theories, and approaches everywhere each being
tested and critiqued, re-conceived and re-written in hopes o f finding validity, legitimacy,
and usefulness in world events. As international relations theory grows as a discipline,
more approaches are tried and re-worked; none are perfect. There are many challenges
we face in the Post-Cold War era, and international relations can and should play an

38John A. Vasquez, "The Post-Positivist Debate: Restructuring Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory
After Enlightenments Fall," in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 238.
39K. J. Holsti, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories o f All?," International Studies Quarterly
VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 261.
^Steve Smith, "The Self-Images o f a Discipline: A Genealogy o f International Relations Theory," in International
Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995),
31.
41Thomas Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," International Studies Quarterly
VOL. 33, NO. 3 (September 1989): 266.
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important role in living up to these challenges.42 It is reasonable to state that each theory
or approach has certain salient features which are worthy o f respect. Efforts should be
made to preserve and promote such features as much as possible. The foregoing is an
outline for assisting both the narrative/historical approach and the empiricist/positivist
approach to international relations using the rational actor model as an organizing
structure.

Part HI - The Six Category Purpose

John Lewis Gaddis writes, "What we need now is a data base that would be
equally relevant to the respective concerns of historians, political scientists, and policy
makers, from which hypotheses could be constructed and tested, and on the basis o f which
we could begin a sustained dialogue among all three groups...."43 Gaddis's archival "data
base" concept, however, is vague and unformed. The enormous amount o f complex
information found in any political story needs to be sorted out and organized before it can
become a truly useful "data base." Using the social science rational actor model as a
starting point, political life is comprised of six distinct elements. These elements include,
the actors themselves, actor assets and liabilities, actor world-view, actor preferences,

42For further elaboration on the role o f current international relations theory on future world events see, Fred Halliday,
"The End o f the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions," in International
Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995),
pp 38-61.
43John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment o f Security Studies,"
International Security VOL. 12, NO. 1 (Summer 1987): 15.
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actor relationships, and the sort of game and outcome actors realize. The six elements
create natural categories from which all research data and variables may be derived.
Working from a near infinite amount o f political data on any subject, these six element
categories should first be filled in to generate a complete matrix o f ideas, sorted by type.
After looking at this organization o f data, it will be easier to gain a better sense o f the big
picture o f a larger political story. The next step for political researchers would be to select
data and variables which they believe are most valuable to their research questions from
within this now organized reflection o f reality , and then proceed with setting up tests to
answer their research questions.

Rational choice theory having roots in utilitarianism philosophy starts with actors
seeking to promote happiness or maximize self-interest.44 Rational choice lends itself to a
wide range o f epistemological starting points, and, as a result, can be used in descriptive
or prescriptive, narrative or quantitative research designs.45 All but a few researchers can
derive some benefit from this kind o f event data lay-out. That said, many scholars, weary
from the struggles of trying to model political science after the physical science mold, are
likely to regard this organizational structure with tired skepticism. Recalling Karl Popper's
clouds and clocks metaphor, valid questions arise like whether one organizational schema
can really be applied to all political events, and, if so, might this not lead to an ontological

^John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Mary Wamock (New York: Meridian Books, 1974), 257.
45Margaret Levi, Karen S. Cook, Jodi A. O'Brien, and Howard Faye, "Introduction: The Limits o f Rationality," in The
Limits o f Rationality, ed. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1990), 4.
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and methodological sameness o f approach.46 Researchers should not feel bound to use the
six category organizational structure imposed by this data base. Creating and using a
single research structure does create the danger o f reductionism and homogeneity of
approach.47 Nevertheless, Gaddis's observation that political scientists (let alone anyone
outside the field) can hardly understand each other is a serious and valid concern, and one
worth working to address. The six category approach is an attempt to accomplish this
with a minimum amount o f intrusion upon the epistemological and ideological approaches
taken by researchers.

The heuristic process o f theory-making in political science involves the selection o f
relevant variables and data from whatever is available. Researchers start their research
programs by going only on well-thought-out hunches. Personal bias, interest, and
observation are what feed the creative mind of the theorist when asking questions,
constructing tests to answer these questions, and choosing data for testing. In the pre
theory stage, no variable is intrinsically more important than another. Only when a
variable is applied to particular issues, tests, and experiments can it be demonstrated to
have more meaning and relevance than another. Surely, Russian military expenditures are
an important variable, but U.S. defense planners have grown equally concerned with the
South American drug trade.48 Both can have a de-stabilizing effect on international
46Karl R. Popper, "Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem o f Rationality and the Freedom o f Man," in
Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Karl R. Popper (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 210.
47(Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco 1977, 489)
48Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Assesses Future Demands o f a Smaller Military Force," The Washington Post, 2 April
1997, 6(A).
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military affairs, but for completely different reasons. Presented with a wider assortment o f
variables for study, perhaps the hostility observed by Ted H opf toward unconventional
perspectives will be lessened as researchers become aware o f how much information
outside the mainstream there is to choose from yet, for no good reason, has been
ignored.49

A controlled brainstorming approach can be used to fill in these six categories with
data to generate a thorough picture of a political event. A concerted effort should be
made to come up with as many details as possible to be placed into each appropriate event
category. The deliberate effort o f accurately depicting a political event through carefully
listing all conceivable variables, both seemingly relevant and irrelevant, will generate a
clearer picture o f the whole political reality then an approach which haphazardly 'ransacks
history' for any relevant data which may happen to be apropos to a research question.50
This organizing effort will require a great deal more work before commencing any serious
research effort. At the same time, however, this organized collection o f data may be used
as a depository for the selection of variables for any research on that particular area. An
infinite number o f complete variable arrangements can be derived from this structure.
Given a more completely developed organizational background, researchers will more
easily see the overall political landscape.

49(Ted Hopf 1993, 208)
“ (John A. Vasquez 1995, 236)
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If we wish to stop ignoring the ‘bottom rungs’ in international relations events, and
start asking the ‘right’ questions, we will need to get as strong an understanding as
possible o f what is going on in the world. As responsible international relations students,
we must be accountable for our decisions on which variables and approaches we choose
for our research. Given a more complete picture of an event, when we choose to focus
our attention on some variables and not on others, we will become more aware we are
doing so. One o f the major issues which feminists, Third World theorists, and others have
with main-stream international relations researchers is that they sometimes ignore certain
issues, while having no knowledge they are even doing so. Selecting specific variables
from among a recognized catalog should help educate researchers on their actions.

In order to fill these categories with information derived from an unabridged and
haphazard documentation o f a world political event, it is worth getting a sense how these
categories work and what goes into them. The following is a more in-depth presentation
o f the six major elements o f a political event, what kinds o f information goes into them as
they function as a data category, and what kinds o f relationships they hold to each other
and the world.
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Part II - Six Categories of a Story

Section 1 - Actor Category
The first task facing researchers is to list all actor variables. Every actor in an
event must first be recognized, and then cataloged into the 'Actor' database. The details o f
their various characteristics, and their relationships to one another may be considered later
on. Questions such as how various actors will feel the impact o f an international relations
event, which actors might have some influence on effecting the outcome o f such an event,
and who has the greatest capability to influence or control an outcome all require answers
which will be addressed as data from the other categories is taken into consideration.

Scholars recognize now that many different actors at many levels can play some
role in international relations. Increased communication and awareness among people all
over the world has led to greater involvement by a wider range o f actors. In the 1980's,
increased market demands by U.S. consumers coupled with the profit motivation o f
Japanese automobile makers and electronics companies almost single-handedly shifted the
United States trade balance from a surplus to deficit status. Neither governments nor
government elites can the take credit or blame for making this come about. During the
famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980's the U.S. entertainment industry adopted this cause
and raised public consciousness along with millions o f dollars to support hunger relief
organizations. Individual popular musicians became involved, influencing others and
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generating support for this cause.51 The fact is, other powerful U. S. actors besides the
United States government were effectively influencing world events and essentially
carrying out foreign policy.

In international relations currently, debate continues over the definition of'actor.'
Kenneth Waltz does not dispute that there are other actors besides states in international
affairs. He believes, however, that "So long as the major states are the major actors, the
structure o f international politics is defined in terms o f them."52 The concept, however, of
states being the 'major actors' is being challenged more and more by ever more powerful
international organizations, corporations, and popular movements. There needs to be a
certain set characteristics which political scientists can agree make up the essence of an
actor. Many researchers wish to broaden consideration o f actors to include such entities.
Perhaps a worthwhile starting point in identifying actors would be to start with a broad
definition. An actor should be worthy of attention if it can influence or can be influenced
by a political event. Since this is a purposely broad data base, there is nothing wrong with
including data deemed irrelevant by some but important by others. Those who do not
consider non-states as entities need not select such data for their research. Generating a
definable list o f conceivable actors in political life based on a common definition o f who
plays a role in political events can be a small first step in developing a common language
for political scientists. Debating whether entities such as Mexican farm workers or only

51David Fricke, "Music News: Band Aid gala is summer highlight," Rolling Stone NO. 451 (4 July 1985): 9.
52Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986), 89.
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nation states constitute actors in international relations is like debating whether electrons
or molecules should be the only things studied in chemistry. Both can play crucial roles,
but under different circumstances. Ignoring one or the other makes research efforts more
manageable, but may not generate answers that have any bearing on reality.

What exactly does this mean in real life, and why is it important? Creative,
unhindered thinking is required to identify all those effected by a particular political event.
It is worth remembering the old adage here that, in the great chain of [political] being,
everything is connected. Using the example o f landmine usage in Southeast Asia during
the Vietnam War, a reasonable research question might start by asking what caused
combatants to choose this particular means o f warfare. While reasonable, this question is
also extraordinarily complex. There are likely hundreds of actors all playing some role in
the deployment o f land mines during the war. Understandably, as research progresses on
this subject, some actors will be found to play a more influential role than others. In order
to start this process, however, such a question needs to be broken down into smaller,
more manageable, components which can help researchers better understand what is really
involved in this complex issue.

The first step is to ask who is involved. The answer to this question is not simply a
list o f countries and leaders. A more complete list would begin to include parties such as
American, Soviet and Chinese manufacturers o f land mines (whose employment roles and
economic well-being are directly tied to this weapon’s proliferation), foot soldiers on all
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sides o f the conflict (who were forced to cope daily with the devastating effects o f land
mines), the families o f these soldiers (who have been forced to cope with the challenges of
supporting injured or otherwise traumatized veterans), local political and economic leaders
in Southeast Asia (who are now forced to figure out how to build a stable society and
economy where a large number of individuals have physical disabilities and where the
surrounding land is unusable because it is too dangerous to tread), local land owners
(whose land assets have become useless because their land can no longer be cultivated,
grazed, or lived upon).53 This list is not nearly complete, but it begins to show how many
people really are involved in the issue o f land mine usage during the Vietnam war. Such
actors are all involved parties either preceding or subsequent to the decision. Some
individuals were highly involved in the decision-making process, while others are nearly
powerless by-standers, yet all play a role.

In this work feminists, Marxists, and Third World theoreticians who legitimately
argue that mainstream theories exclude major segments o f the population will finally find a
voice in filling in the actor category.54 The actor category of research is only concerned
with who is involved. At this point all actors are equal since the only question is whether
they exist. Whether actors have any significant ability to influence each other or a game
outcome is a concern for research in other categories.

53Donovan Webster, "One Leg, One Life at a Time," The N ew York Times Magazine. 23 January 1994, 42.
^J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in International Relations Theory Today, ed Ken Booth and Steve Smith
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 190.
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Beginning by asking a more manageable question like, 'who is involved,' is more
likely to generate practical information to start a research project, than would forcing
ourselves to confront the whole range of issues when we try to address complex
questions. How ethnic tensions in Central Europe threaten overall world peace is a
question we currently fail to have the capability to adequately address. The question o f
who is involved, can generate a common organizational scheme and common language
which can help organize the way we as political scientists approach a particular story.
Once we have come up with answers to such really fundamental questions as 'who,' we
can move on to address the other elements which fill in the six category structure. After
all that work is done, we can then move on to start asking our real research questions with
a better chance o f finding answers.

Section 2 - Preference Category
The second requirement involved in understanding any international event consists
o f discovering the needs and preferences o f each actor. In a world without needs, there
would be no motivation to do anything. Put another way, without preferences (some
might call it greed), no king would ever go to war. The actor preference category deals
with what thing or things an actor is trying to accomplish or possess. The rational actor
model assumes all actors have preferences which they work to attain, or problems for
which they seek solutions. In game theory, a state of dis-equilibrium occurs when a
player's preference is strong enough that it is willing to take action to get what it wants.
Action taken to obtain a preferred state starts the game. The solution to these problems
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are outcomes. For example, the United States government is faced with the problem of
assuring an enormous supply o f oil to an energy-hungry nation. One solution to this
problem involves maintaining influence in an oil-rich region o f the world (the Middle East)
to assure a constant source o f energy to the U.S..

Preferences are actor defined. As an actor identifies shortcomings in its world, it
searches for the means by which these shortcomings may be addressed. The decision that
life will be better by attaining a certain preferred state is a value judgement made by each
actor. How ah actor comes to have one preference or interest over another is an area of
considerable research in political science. At a certain level, basic human needs must be
met, and this will help determine actor preferences. Social and cultural structures also
play some role.55 Beyond that, it is very difficult to be sure what an actor's preferences are
in a given situation. Robert Keohane writes that, "self-interest is so elastic."56 One actor's
idea o f a better life is rarely the same as another actor's. Some examples o f current actor
preferences are, independence for Ireland, a secure homeland for Jews, greater access to
the Japanese market for American auto-makers, freedom from persecution for European
Gypsies, foreign investment capital for Russian businesses.

Actor desires are rarely o f equal importance. Actors generally find many things
wrong with their world (this seems to be the human condition), but there are usually only

55Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory o f Preference Formation,"
American Political Science Review VOL. 81, NO. 1 (March 1987): 5.
56Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 122.
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a very small number o f these things which are genuinely intolerable and in need of remedy.
The famous game o f the ‘Prisoner's Dilemma,’ is a dilemma for the simple reason that
each prisoner has a range o f preferences. Acting on the strongest preference o f avoiding a
stay in jail altogether can actually have the opposite affect. Acting on the lesser preference
o f staying for a short period o f time (compared to a long period o f time) may pay off very
well or pay off very poorly. At root, it is the actors’ preferences which drive the game.
Israel, for example, is a vulnerable country facing many problems. It faces security
concerns being geographically surrounded by hostile neighbors against the Mediterranean
Sea. It faces economic concerns being an isolated industrialized nation in a relatively
lesser developed region. It faces philosophical concerns being a non-Moslem country in
an Islamic region o f the world. And, like all countries in the mid-east, Israel must deal
with the problem o f finding fresh water in a desert environment. In what order does Israel
place these priorities when all are crucial to its survival? Stated otherwise, how willing
might Israel be to go to war to maintain, for example, a traditional Hebrew way o f life, or
a secure Jewish homeland, or a stable economy, or enough fresh water to irrigate lawns
and wash cars on the West Bank? As social scientists, we can roughly calculate which
preferences are most important by measuring how vigorously each is pursued.

To confuse matters further, however, we must also be aware that what an actor
may think is important and what its actual measurable behavior reflects may be quite
different. Behavioral observations can be misleading since researchers observing an actor
see the acted upon choice, which may or may not be what the actor really believes is the
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greatest preference (or finest state of affairs).57 When considering an actor as large and
diverse as the European Union, whose scope o f concerns is concomitantly much broader,
figuring out a preference hierarchy becomes that much more difficult.

The acted upon preference of an actor will have considerable bearing on its
relationship with other actors. When one actor's interest is the same as another actor's, the
actors may seek ways o f acting in cooperation. Alternatively, if both have a preference for
a limited resource, there may be bitter competition for ownership. Different actors may
also have multiple mixed preferences which can generate relationships o f conflict or
cooperation depending upon what is at stake. For example, when the desire is simply
chemical weapons control, chemical companies are generally supportive and
pronouncements o f cooperation common, but when further discussion moves toward the
need to fingerprint chemicals, document production procedures, and account for the sale
and transfer o f exact quantities, these same actors become suspicious corporate foes
weary o f bureaucratic entanglement and industrial espionage.58 Like the proverbial chess
game, an actor's action taken to pursue one preference, may or may not hinder or assist
the pursuit o f another preference. With every move o f every actor linked, missteps often
occur due to an incomplete understanding of the consequences of each action.

As one actor pursues its interest, the world changes and the effects are felt by

57Amartya Sen, "Behavior and the Concept of Preference," Economica VOL. 40, NO. 159 (August 1973): 241.
58Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban," Orbis: A Journal o f World Affairs VOL. 36, NO. 2
(Spring 1992): 246.
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other actors. One actor's self-interest will conflict with another actor's preferences, and a
state o f dis-equilibrium will arise. For example, a number of industrialized states got
together in the 1980's and realized their common desire to limit easy access to chemical
materials used to make chemical weapons. The Australia Group o f industrialized nations
began voluntarily placing controls on the commercial flow o f precursor chemicals
throughout the world. Since these states produced most of the world's chemicals and
served as the major trade source for them, countries needing these chemicals for a number
o f legitimate reasons had a difficult time getting them.59 While the move to curb chemical
sales created a more difficult situation o f for those seeking chemicals for weapons
purposes, others seeking chemicals for uses such as fertilizer production and
manufacturing found it difficult to procure them as well. While one group o f countries
desires fewer states to have a chemical weapons capacity; another group seeking
chemicals for various purposes wants unrestricted trade access to this important industrial
resource.

Section 3 - Asset/Liability Category
Assuming a definitive set o f actors at work in a particular turn in an international
relations game, each actor needs to be examined to assess its particular capabilities. The
neostructuralist concern with the "interrelation between policies and their wider socio
economic and ideological domestic and international setting" is not unlike the what is

59Hassan Mashhadi, "The Cost of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the Developing Countries," Disarmament
V O L .16, NO. 1 (1993): 79.
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suggested when filling in the asset/liability category.60 Neostructuralism calls for
consideration o f "transformative processes" at the local, national, and international level.61
This being the case, a much more holistic review o f actors must take place. This category
examines these ’transformative processes' to give life and depth to the actors and their
preferences. It is these assets and liabilities which dictate what an actor can or cannot do
in any particular international relations game.

As with the definition and identification of actors above, it is worth constructing
some definitions o f what constitute assets and liabilities. Armed with such definitions,
each actor's assets and liabilities may be better identified. Actor assets and liabilities in
international relations are the tools or resources an actor uses to influence the outcome of
a game. To be clear, the importance o f different assets or liabilities to an actor in one turn
o f a game, may not display the same importance in another game. For example, Iraq has
been known to possess chemical weapons since the mid-1970’s. 62 Iraq used chemical
weapons against Iran during the Iran/Iraq War. Despite documented widespread use
against unprotected populations resulting in hundreds o f casualties, this activity never
gained significant world attention.63 Two years later, however, the mere threat o f using

“ Barry Gills & Ronan P. Palen, "The Neostructural Agenda in International Relations," in Transcending the State-Global
D ivide, ed. Ronan P. Palen and Barry Bills (Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1994), 6.
“ (Gills & Palen 1994, 7)
“ Valerie Adams, Chemical Warfare. Chemical Disarmament (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 85.
“ Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Valayati in Working Paper ft 25, in The Control o f Chemical and Biological Weapons
(CBW): Strengthening International Verification and Compliance: Conference Summary Toronto. Canada. April 4-5. 1990.
by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Peace and
Security, 1990), 25.
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this same asset against Israel provoked world-wide condemnation and a rush to support
Israel.64 While amounting to little more than a footnote in history in one situation, Iraq's
chemical weapons capability was considered a critically important major world threat in
another situation.

The difference between assets and liabilities needs to be made clear. While both
play a role in determining the impact an actor may have upon a particular situation, they
do so from opposite directions. Put in rational choice terms, an asset aids an actor in
maximizing its personal welfare, while a liability minimizes personal welfare. In any game,
an actor will look at its liabilities to assess what it needs to do maintain or improve its lot.
In simplest terms, from an actor's list o f liabilities will arise the preferences which may be
perused in a game. If an actor is successful in a game, a pre-game liability can become a
post-game asset.

In theory, the concept o f assets and liabilities is a straight-forward and important
element in determining the course of relations between actors. In reality, however, this
likely to be an extraordinarily complex undertaking. For example, one might think that a
state's possession o f any weapons system would be considered an asset. Certainly, the
Soviet Union's procurement o f chemical weapons would lead one to assume that they
were considered by military planners an asset to be obtained. Times change, however, and
this is no longer quite so. What was once an asset, is now a liability. The Soviet Union

MJoel Brinkley, "Israel Declares Emergency; Staying Indoors Urged," The New York Tim es. 17 January 1991, (A)18.
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had a considerable chemical weapons capability, but in comparison to its overall strategic
capability, chemical weapons are not that critical. Furthermore, in the current Post-Cold
W ar era where the Russian government is strapped for cash, aging and toxic chemical
stockpiles, vulnerable to domestic and international terrorism, human error, and natural
calamity, are proving an expensive problem for Russia. In fact, U.S./Soviet negotiations
in 1990 on the bilateral destruction o f chemical weapons explored the possibility o f U.S.
funding o f Soviet chemical weapons destruction. 65 While at one point such weapons were
believed essential to Soviet national security, Russians are confronted with a changed
picture o f reality. These negotiations illustrate how Russian leaders now view these
weapons as a troublesome liability they would be happy to be without.

Once a clear catalog has been generated of each actor's assets and liabilities within
an issue area, a ranking needs to be done to weigh different actors' assets against one
another. Within this ranking we will discover that some actor assets or liabilities have
relevance to a particular issue currently brewing in international affairs while others have
almost none. The seemingly minor fact, for example, o f who chairs the U.S. Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee has had crucial relevance to U.S. financial support for the
United Nations. North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms's dislike for international
organization, in general, and the United Nations, in particular, has placed a considerable
burden on how that organization is able to operate. Despite stated endorsements o f the

65Amy E. Smithson, "Chemicals Destruction: The Work Begins," The Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists VOL. 49, NO. 3
(April 1993): 42.
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work done by the U. N. by U. S. administration officials, other actors within U. S. national
leadership have been able to successfully execute a policy o f lack o f support. A seemingly
minor capability (such as control o f a deliberating body's legislative agenda) o f a seemingly
minor, though well placed, actor may often have disproportionate influence on
international affairs.

Section 4 - World-view Category
This part o f the international relations puzzle concerns itself with the world view
and belief systems held by an actor. This element o f the data base is important because it
explores an actor's pre-existing mind set which can help to explain why an actor behaves .
the way it does. The assets and liabilities possessed by an actor only tell part of the story;
actor preferences tell another part. The world-view category documents how an actor
looks at the world, how it understands the world to operate, and how it views itself and
how it views others.

An actor's behavior system is multi-faceted, and which facet is reflected in the
actor's behavior depends on a number o f complex factors. To illustrate some o f the
multiple outlooks arising out o f a single actor consider the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament (CD). As an actor, it takes on certain responsibilities in world affairs, and
undertakes certain activities to uphold these responsibilities. N ot surprising, each member
nation o f the Conference comes to the group with a particular world-view and
perspective. Participants may come with strongly market-oriented, socialist, nationalist,

regionalist, religious, altruist, or even racist views. Some representatives are highly fearful
o f war because o f their location or minority status, while other are less so. Some states
operate within a highly theocratic society, while others more secular. All o f these world
views come together in one international organization. The behavior o f the body as a
whole on a certain decision may reflect one perspective or another, a mix o f perspectives,
or a perspective unique to the CD. Certainly, however, as an organization charged with
promoting international peace, a pacific outlook by representatives is generally the
prominent world view expressed.66

Some well known examples o f actor world-views may be seen in realist and
idealist theories. Realism and Idealism are conceptions o f reality which help guide
behavior. Perceptions such as those generated through realist or idealist thinking can help
to determine actor preferences and behavior. For example, looking at the events leading
to World W ar I, an unexpected change in Russian world-view played a major role in the
onset o f the war. In 1908, Austria annexed the Turkish province o f Bosnia. Serbia
reacted to this and sought support from Russia. When Germany came to the side o f
Austria, Russia backed down from supporting Serbia. At this point, Russia was feeling
insecure having recently lost the war in the East in 1905, and having no other allies. When
in 1914 Germany came to the side o f Austria-Hungary, Germany believed that Russia
would, again, back down from supporting Serbia. This time, Russia having recovered

“ Different states' views on the divisive issue o f chemical weapons control may be observed to contrast, yet, converge to
support the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention. See articles by Hassan Mashhadi, Prekash Shah, Adolph Ritter von
Wagner, and Ameka A. Azikiwe in Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations VOL. 16, NO. 1 (1993).
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from the war in 1905 and having France as an ally, did not. Changes in Russia's assets,
engendered greater feelings o f empowerment on the part o f Russia. This shift in Russia's
world view from lesser power to greater power brought about a change in Russian foreign
policy. Germany's failure to anticipate this change in Russian thinking is one important
cause leading to the outbreak o f World War I.67

Section 5 - Game Category
The game category seeks to model how a set o f actors are arranged how they
relate to each other across the international relations landscape. From modeling, an
understanding is sought on the strategies used by actors to pursue their preferences. If
actors have been identified, their preferences identified, their assents and liabilities
cataloged, and their world-views understood, the next thing to consider in an event data
base is how all these complex actors come together to interact with one another. This
category involves using mathematically-derived game theory to construct a simplified form
o f reality from which researchers can more easily understand what is going on.

In a particular turn o f a game, there will be two or more actors, each with
different, conflicting preferences. One actor will want one thing, while another actor will
want another. Game theoreticians have outlined a number o f models which recreate how
a set o f actors will relate to one another. By assessing the degree o f risk and the size o f
payoff* an actor is willing to take to pursue a particular outcome, one can figure out

67L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History; From Prehistory to the Present (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988), 602.
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possible outcomes and the likelihood o f such outcomes in a given game.68 Looking at
such things as the likelihood o f success in achieving the most desired outcome over
another lesser desired outcome, the degree o f risk involved when using a particular
strategy, the importance to an actor in attaining one outcome over another, the possibility
that another outcome might be equally acceptable, the amount o f information an actor has
about the other and about what will happen under certain circumstances, as well as the
prospects o f cooperation between actors can help researchers both explain and predict
events.

Consider the example o f the government o f Iraq's quest to develop a chemical
warfare capability. When studying two among many possible individual actors, one may
need to look at many difficult issues to construct a model between only two players. If the
actors being observed are the German chemical industry and the Iraqi Ministry o f
Agriculture, how are the two actors put together in a game? Which actor possessing
which assets or liabilities is most able to pursue its goals under given circumstances, and
how does it do so? Are the vast technological, material, and intellectual resources o f the
German chemical industry a relevant asset when seeking to control the flow o f precursor
chemicals around the world? Are the Iraqi agriculture ministry's knowledge o f complex
chemical trade issues and its strong government-wide support sufficient assets to help Iraq
procure chemical materials to build a potent chemical weapons arsenal? These two

“ Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavior Model o f Rational Choice," in Models o f Man: Social and Rational. Herbert A. Simon
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957): 244.
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distantly related actors have different preferences and different capabilities. It is not at all
easy to compare these two actors; it is not even easy to see the relationship between the
them. German chemical industry, while motivated primarily by profit, is within a major
Western industrialized state actively concerned with chemical weapons proliferation. The
Iraqi agriculture ministry, on the other hand, closely connected to the Sadam Hussein’s
military, has played an important role in the acquisition o f chemicals to be used in chemical
weapons. In fact, these two actors have had significant interaction in the past for both
legitimate agricultural purposes as well as for other more questionable purposes.69 Here is
where a simplified model can play a helpful role. The goal o f research in the area o f the
game category is to identify the kinds of relationships that exist, and assess their meaning.
With careful construction only the most germane pieces o f information are made part o f
the model to help figure out what sorts o f moves each player is likely to make.

The power o f game theory to explain political life has made it one o f the more
promising fields in political science. Game theory modeling enables researchers to focus
on how actors come by strategies which determine the actor's behavior. Using the Game
category part o f the data base, researchers can better understand the probabilities of
outcomes and sometimes even predict outcomes. Its use, however, is dependent upon an
advanced understanding o f the entire political scene which is why understanding actors,
their preferences, and their assets and liabilities is most helpful from the start.

69John J. Fialka, "Fighting Dirty: Western Industry Sells Third World Means To Produce Poison Gas," Wall Street
Journal. 16 March 1988, 1(A) and 22(A).
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Section 6 - Outcome Category
The outcome to a game for an actor should, with luck, reflect the original
preference o f the actor. This outcome is the result o f an actor's efforts toward maximizing
its self-interest. In a perfect world, each actor's preferences would eventually become the
game outcome. In reality, o f course, since there are always at least two players, and since
so many games are zero-sum (meaning only one player can win) actors will often fail to
succeed and achieve their preferences. Remember that the image o f a possible new world
order which Adolf Hitler envisioned before he set out for the conquest o f Europe was
radically different from the reality he faced in April o f 1945.

The outcome category is a listing o f potential states o f reality after the different
actors in a game have taken their respective turns. Since there are many possible turns
one player can take in any game, even in a single turn game, let alone an iterated
(repeated) game, many possible outcomes exist. In international relations, every game is
essentially iterated since there is always some kind o f response to every move a particular
player makes. The world’s players rarely ever go away but must wake up the next day to
face each other all over again.70 As a result, the number o f outcomes, in the long run, can
be considerable. As in a chess game, the more potential outcomes there are to a game, the
more consideration regarding what moves should be made is necessary. With a list o f
potential outcomes, will come a similar ordered range o f desired outcomes as well.

70(Robert Axelrod 1984, 12)
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P a rt H I -

Conclusion

The six category structuring system for political events data addresses three major
problems facing political researchers. First, it helps foster the development o f common
ways o f thinking about political events. Second, it helps increase recognition for all kinds
o f variables large and small. Third, it helps researchers see a larger picture of a political
issue, wherein this fuller knowledge can help them construct better experiments and
theories. These are briefly discussed below.

Com m on W ays of T hinking
The six category matrix allows a plurality o f thinking regarding philosophical
outlook, and methodological approach. Looking at political life through an organization
o f six categories provides a common library o f data to test and study. This organization
will force some to acknowledge some phenomena, if only to reject them. Debate
regarding the nature o f variables will arise, but it will center on composition and relevance
rather then its very existence. Those who are trying to explain or predict world events in
a purely empirical sense can use the six categories, and those who build theory hoping to
change behavior around the world in a normative, prescriptive sense can benefit as well.
A broad range o f different philosophical outlooks may accommodated as well. Realist,
idealists, feminists, Marxists, and others are epistemologically accommodated with this
structure, because depending on the interest of each, the focus o f their research can
proceed in any chosen direction after using the data ordering o f the six categories as a
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starting point. The six categories do not place a value on a given variable. The researcher
can select or reject a variable depending upon his or her perceived value o f a variable or
his or her interest in or experience with a research variable.

While this structure provides an order to the otherwise jumbled data o f real life,
those who do use it do face some risk. On the one hand, this is good for political science
which suffers from many schools o f thought who are unable to communicate with one
another. On the other hand, this is bad because using a common rational epidemiological
outlook precludes other epistemologies. A common source o f data which promotes a
common starting point and some commonality o f language may be seen as reductionist.
At a very theoretical level, some researchers may bridle at this ontological monism. When
this is the case, researchers should not feel bound to the six category way o f thinking. It
can assist in helping develop a common language o f political science, but no one likes
being forced to speak a language foreign to them.

Equalize A ctors in Political Life
The thousands o f variables at work in any international relations issue can no
longer continue to go unrecognized and ignored; we must learn to acknowledge and deal
with them in one way or another. Using the six category system, when a researcher
selects certain variables at the start o f a research project, he or she will be forced to be
more consciousous because he or she will be forced to face the whole range o f variables in
a particular category in order to select the ones on which he or she wants to do research.
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Without any structure for ordering data, a researcher only has to pick any variable at hand
and not be obliged to acknowledge the whole range o f existent variables. A more
conscious and considered process for selecting variables and data to test and study forces
researchers to think harder every step o f the way. Poor data selection, means poor
research results. Poor data selection also means researchers are more open to criticism by
others eager to point out selection bias.

In this age o f Post-Positive heightened sensitivity to more political actors and
details, using a structure which draws out political data from all sources in a nonjudgmental fashion will lend more credibility to people and their problems often minimized
or ignored in the past. As merely possible items for research and exploration on a long
list, no variable is more important than another. Relevance is demonstrated when testing
proves that a variable's presence causes something to happen, or that it has some kind of
definable relationship to something else. Alone, with no referents, one piece o f data is the
same as another. What this means for woman, minorities, Third World actors, and others
is that they are able to take a seat beside major corporations, super-power nations, and
world leaders. Whether these different variables have the same impact on world events,
and whether they can play similar roles is unlikely, but they are less likely to be forgotten.
I f we accept the notion that Micronesian islanders are an actor in the global warming
debate, we must come to respect their assets and liabilities, preferences, and the game they
will play in this realm. There may be little they can do to impact events, but they are there,
and they do have a role. Cynthia Enloe writes, “It is only by delving deeper into any
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political system, listening more attentively at its margins, that one can accurately estimate
the powers it has taken to provide the state with the apparent stability that has permitted
its elite to presume to speak on behalf o f a coherent whole.”71 The problem rests in
figuring out a way to hear these margins over the clamor o f the center. Taking the time to
painstakingly list all the different voices across the spectrum can help.

Many variables are truly irrelevant, but this will never be known if we fail to even
recognize their existence. Currently, the only way to find out the importance o f different
data in political science is to actually use it in research and find out by trial and error if it is
relevant or not. This can be accomplished in a more organized fashion if the variables and
data are themselves organized. Checking through an ordered list to find out which
variables play a role in generating a particular outcome in a political event makes more
sense than simply testing whatever comes up that seems to make sense in no particular
order.

Better Overall Picture
Stepping back and looking at this huge database, the dominance of one
philosophical or political outlook will be much more difficult because we will be forced to
recognize the immensely broad range o f actors, assets and liabilities, preferences, world
views, and possible games played in the world. The clear involvement of all levels o f
analysis will challenge the ways staunch realists look at the world. Alternatively, looking

71(Enloe 1996, 200)
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at the undeniably strong hand which large state actors have in shaping world events will
challenge those who say more focus should be placed elsewhere. Creating a means by
which researchers can all get this broad view o f the world should help them have a better
sense o f where they and their research fit in.

M ost importantly, researchers on their way to selecting variables and phenomena
on which to conduct research will be forced to recognize the existence o f a richer, more
diverse, political world than that to which they are accustomed. This observation must
surely influence variable selection, experiment design, and theory construction. Laying
out the entire U. S./Soviet Cold War relationship would necessarily include data on the
role played by, and the experience of, ordinary Russian and American citizens. Perhaps
observations would have been made which would have given some warning about future
events within the Soviet Union. The goal is to avoid being blind to the political turmoil
under our noses as we stare out to space looking for the dangers beyond.
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